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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the effect of the design of yardstick competition on con-
sumer prices, by means of a theoretical analysis as well as an economic experiment.
We compare four different designs: the uniform yardstick, the unweighted uniform
yardstick, the discriminatory yardstick, and the best-practice yardstick. The effect
of a specific design on prices depends on two separate mechanisms, one which affects
the incentive power to increase productive efficiency and another which affects the
risk of collusion. We show theoretically that for the best-practice yardstick these
two mechanisms point in the same direction (high prices), which is confirmed by the
experiment. The theoretical analysis also shows that the discriminatory yardstick re-
sults in lower prices than the unweighted uniform yardstick, which is also confirmed
by the economic experiment. The theory, however, does not give a clear answer on
the relative performance of the discriminatory versus the uniform yardstick. In the
experimental analysis, we find that the advantage of the discriminatory yardstick in
terms of giving incentives to improve productive efficiency exceeds the disadvantage
of a relatively higher risk of collusion. This conclusion appears to be robust for dif-
ferent degrees of heterogeneity of the industry. Hence the discriminatory yardstick
yields the lowest prices for consumers.
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1 Introduction
In order to give monopolistic firms incentives to increase their productive efficiency while
the realized benefits are passed on to consumers, regulators may apply yardstick com-
petition. In this type of regulation, the (maximum) price for consumers is based on
the costs of a group of similar firms (Shleifer, 1985). Experiences with yardstick regula-
tion exist in different countries, such as in the United Kingdom with the water supply
and sewerage industry and the electricity networks (Dassler, Parker and Saal, 2006; Ja-
masb and Pollitt, 2007), in the Netherlands with the energy-distribution grids (Haffner,
Delmer and Van Til, 2010), in Spain also with the energy grids (Bla´zques-Go´mez and
Grifell-Tatje´, 2011), in Japan with railways (Mizutani, Kozumi and Matsushima, 2009)
and in Norway with bus transport services (Dalen and Gomez-Lobo, 2002). In several
cases, the introduction of yardstick regulation improved productive efficiency or resulted
in lower consumer prices. In other cases, however, the experience appeared to be less
successful.
The ultimate price effect of yardstick competition depends on two different mecha-
nisms: the incentives for firms to increase their productive efficiency and the incentives
for firms to collude with each other. A yardstick that performs well under the assumption
that firms behave non-cooperatively may still backfire if it facilitates collusion. Within
a regulatory system of yardstick competition, collusion means that the firms agree, per-
haps tacitly, with each other not to reduce costs or to jointly manipulate productivity
reports (Tanger˚as, 2002). While giving incentives to increase efficiency belongs to the
key objectives of yardstick competition, the incentives to collude are unintended and
related to how yardstick competition is implemented. Both effects have to be analyzed
in order to determine the impact of yardstick competition on consumer prices.
The incentive power to raise productive efficiency is higher, the less a firm’s regulated
price is related to its own costs. If the price is capped on the level of the (average) costs
of (all) other firms, this power is maximized, meaning that high-powered incentives
are given to that firm to reduce costs. This type of yardstick competition is called
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discriminatory-yardstick competition, referring to the fact that every firm faces a specific
price cap (i.e. the average costs of the other firms). If the maximum price is based on
the costs of all firms, the incentive power to increase efficiency depends on the share of a
firm’s costs in the regulated price. This type of yardstick competition is called uniform
yardstick competition, as each firm faces the same price cap. The uniform yardstick can
be calculated on the basis of weighted or unweighted average costs. The incentive power
is ex ante undetermined when the yardstick is based on the costs of the most efficient firm
(the so-called best-practice yardstick), as all less efficient firms face the highest incentive
power, while the most efficient firm does not face any incentive to become even more
efficient. Hence, it is clear that the impact of yardstick competition on the incentives
for firms to increase productive efficiency depends on how the yardstick is determined.
The incentives to reduce costs may, however, be (partly) neutralized if firms also
have the incentive to collude with each other, i.e. to make agreements not to reduce
costs. The incentives for individual firms to collude depends on a trade-off between the
short-run benefits of cheating, versus the long-run opportunity costs of a collapse of the
cartel. In an experiment, Potters et al. (2004) find that the incentive to collude with
equally sized firms is higher when a discriminatory yardstick is applied compared to
a situation with a uniform yardstick. Apparently, the authors conclude, the stronger
incentives to collude with a discriminatory yardstick outweigh the higher incentive to
raise productive efficiency. Yet, this effect is only shown for equally-sized firms, raising
the question whether a more heterogeneous firm-size distribution would give the same
result. From Dijkstra, Haan, and Mulder (2014), we know that the incentive to collude
in case of a weighted uniform yardstick is related to the industry structure: in more
heterogeneous industries, firms appear to collude less than in homogeneous industries.
Hence, in order to determine the ultimate effect of yardstick competition on consumer
prices, the trade-off between the incentive power and the incentive to collude has to be
assessed for different industry structures. As this trade-off depends on the magnitude of
both effects, a theoretical analysis is not sufficient to make the assessment. Therefore,
we conduct a laboratory experiment. The objective of this experiment is to determine
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the optimal design of the yardstick from the perspective of consumers taking into ac-
count both the incentives for efficiency improvement and the risk of collusion among the
participants of the yardstick competition.
In our experiment we let agents decide upon cost levels while they know that their
output prices are set by a regulator using a specific form of yardstick competition. This
design of the experiment is similar to Dijkstra et al. (2014). We use a simple model,
loosely based on Shleifer (1985), where firms have to exert costly effort to lower their
costs. For simplicity, managerial benefits are a concave and quadratic function of a firm’s
marginal costs. Managers aim to maximize the sum of profits and managerial benefits,
and do so in a repeated game.
First, assuming a heterogeneous industry structure consisting of 2 firms, we analyze
the impact of different definitions of the yardstick on the price for consumers. The
yardsticks analyzed are the discriminatory, weighted uniform, unweighted uniform and
best-practice. In each case we analyze which cost decisions firms make, to what extent
they collude and what the ultimate price for consumers is. We find that the price for
consumers is highest for a best-practice yardstick, while a discriminatory yardstick yields
prices that are lower (i.e. closer to the social optimum) than an unweighted uniform
yardstick.
Next, we zoom in on two particular yardsticks: the (weighted) uniform and the
discriminatory yardstick. These two yardsticks are most often used in practice, while
theory does not provide a clear prediction in terms of their market performance. We
find that overall, i.e. taking into account a number of different industry structures, the
discriminatory yardstick results in the most efficient consumer prices. From this we
conclude that the discriminatory yardstick is the preferred yardstick in order to raise
productive efficiency of monopolistic firms and to pass on these benefits to consumers.
In a companion paper (Dijkstra et al., 2014) we use a similar set-up to study the
effect of industry structure on regulated prices with a (weighted) uniform yardstick.
Therefore, parts of the description of the theoretical model and the experimental set-up
in this paper closely follow that in our companion paper. The structure of this paper is as
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follows. Section 2 describes our theoretical model. The experimental design is presented
in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the result of our experiment with 4 yardsticks, while
Section 5 discusses the comparison between the discriminatory and (weighted) uniform
yardsticks. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
We consider the following model. There are n firms that play an infinitely repeated
game. Each firm acts as a local monopolist. For simplicity, we assume that firm i faces
demand that is completely inelastic and exogenously given by mass αi ∈ (0, 1). We
normalize total demand, so
∑n
i=1 αi = 1. For ease of exposition, we will refer to αi
as the market share of firm i. In each round, firm i decides on its constant marginal
cost ci for that round. Firm i’s profits then equal pii(ci, c−i) = (p
y
i (ci, c−i)− ci)αi, with
pyi the price that firm i can set under yardstick y, and the vector c−i consists of the
cost levels chosen by the other firms. We assume that the manager of firm i maximizes
ui = pii(ci, c−i) +Ri(ci), with Ri a managerial benefit that is non-negative and concave:
Ri ≥ 0, R′′i < 0, and Ri(0) = 0. Note that this specification is equivalent to Shleifer
(1985), where managers invest in a cost-reducing technology.1 For simplicity, we use the
following quadratic specification:
R(ci) =
(−ac2i + bci)αi, (1)
where a, b ∈ R+ are parameters and ci ∈ [0, b/a]. Throughout, we assume that a and
b are such that all expressions that we derive are well defined. The assumption that
1In Shleifer (1985), firms invest R(c) in a cost-reducing technology that lowers marginal cost by c.
With downward sloping demand, the monopolist cannot fully capture the social welfare generated by
lower costs. Hence it will underinvest from a welfare perspective. This is no longer true, however, if
demand is inelastic. In that case, the monopolist does capture the entire surplus and hence there is
no underinvestment. For experimental simplicity, we do assume inelastic demand. We therefore use a
slightly different set-up. We effectively assume that the manager of the firm has to exert some costly
effort to lower costs. The discrepancy between the private and social optimum is then caused by the fact
that the manager’s costly effort is not taken into account when maximizing social welfare. This allows
us to generate the same theoretical prediction (that firms underinvest), but in a simpler set-up. Note
that our interpretation closely follows Potters et al. (2004).
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managerial benefit is proportional to market share is for consistency: if the market
is shared among more firms, we do not want total managerial benefit to exogenously
increase as a result. Note that we allow Ri to be decreasing in ci for large enough ci.
In electricity networks for example, high marginal costs are often associated with a lack
of maintenance. Such networks are prone to outages, compensation claims and political
pressure, all factors that imply higher costs and do not exactly contribute to a quiet
life for the manager. Also, this choice simplifies the experimental implementation of our
model. The manager of firm i is thus assumed to maximize
ui = (p
y
i (ci, c−i)− ci)αi +
(−ac2i + bci)αi. (2)





If consumers value the product at v, total welfare equals
W = (v − p) + (p− c) + (−ac2 + bc) , (4)
where the first term is consumer surplus, and the other two terms is the total payoff to





2.2 Yardsticks, non-cooperative behavior
With a Uniform yardstick,2 the price firm i can charge equals the weighted average of
all cost levels in the industry:




Plugging this into (2) and maximizing with respect to ci yields the non-cooperative cost
level
cU∗i =
b− 1 + αi
2a
. (7)
2As the regulation literature usually refers to the weighted uniform yardstick as “uniform”, we also
follow that convention here.
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Note that this is a dominant strategy, as it does not depend on the cost choices of the
other firms. Also note that a firm with a higher market share αi has a stronger influence
on the regulated price, hence it will choose a higher cost level. Third, with αi < 1,
the equilibrium cost level is strictly lower than the cost level that maximizes managerial
benefits, but higher than the social optimum. The regulated price now becomes
pU∗ ≡ pU (cU∗1 , . . . , cU∗n ) = n∑
i=1
αi












With a uniform unweighted yardstick, the price firm i can charge equals the unweighted
average of all cost levels in the industry:






In our experiment, we will refer to this treatment as EqualW – for equal weights.
Plugging (9) into (2) and maximizing with respect to ci yields
cE∗i =
b− 1 + 1n
2a
. (10)
Hence, the non-cooperative cost level is now the same for all firms, as all firms have the
same influence on the regulated price. Again, non-cooperative cost levels are strictly
between the social optimum and the level that maximizes managerial benefits. The
regulated price becomes
pE∗ ≡ (cE∗1 , . . . , cE∗n ) = 1n
n∑
i=1









With a discriminatory yardstick (denoted Discrim in our experiment), the price firm i
can charge equals the weighted average of the cost levels of all other firms in the industry:





Note that our notation reflects that in this case the price is firm-specific. Plugging (12)






Note therefore that this yardstick yields the social welfare optimum derived in (5). Also,
all firms will choose the same cost level. The regulated price now differs per firm. Since






















With the best-practice yardstick (BestPr), the regulated price equals the lowest cost
level of all firms in the industry:
pB(c1, . . . , cn) = min{cj}. (15)
Finding the Nash equilibrium now is somewhat more involved. Suppose all other firms
set c∗. By setting some c < c∗, manager 1 earns
ui (c1, c
∗, . . . , c∗) = (c− c)αi +
(−ac2 + bc)αi, (16)
which is maximized by setting c = b/2a. This implies that if the other firms set some
c∗ ≤ b/2a, this firm has no incentive to defect to a lower cost level: its maximization
problem under the constraint that c ≤ c∗ is given by the corner solution c = c∗.
By setting some c > c∗, manager i earns
ui (c1, c
∗, . . . , c∗) = (c∗ − c)αi +
(−ac2 + bc)αi, (17)
which is maximized by setting c = (b − 1)/2a. This implies that if the other firms set
some c∗ ≥ (b− 1) /2a, this firm has no incentive to defect to a higher cost level: its
maximization problem under the constraint that c ≥ c∗ is given by the corner solution
c = c∗. This implies that we have a continuum of equilibria: any
cB∗ ∈ [(b− 1) /2a, b/2a] (18)
is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, possible Nash equilibria range from the social optimum
to the outcome that maximizes managerial utility. By construction, (18) also gives the
range of equilibrium prices. Given the multiplicity of equilibria in this case, we expect
players to coordinate on the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, which implies
pB∗ = b/2a. (19)
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From the above, we immediately have3
Theorem 1. Regulated prices in the non-cooperative outcome are ranked
Discrim < EqualW ≤ Uniform < BestPr.
Only with symmetric market shares, EqualW = Uniform.
2.3 Collusion
As usual, a cartel is stable if the short-run benefits of defection are outweighed by the
long-term losses due to a cartel breakdown. In other words, following e.g. Friedman
(1971) we assume grim trigger strategies and look for the critical discount factor δˆ such
that all managers have an incentive to stick to the cartel agreement. With the usual
arguments manager i does not defect if and only if
uyiK







with uyiD the utility of manager i when she defects, u
y
iK her utility in a cartel, and u
y
iN
her utility in the non-cooperative outcome. This implies that we require





For collusion to be sustainable, we need that this condition is satisfied for all managers:
δ > δˆy ≡ max
{




We will focus on the cartel agreement in which all managers set the same cost level
ck that maximizes the sum of their utilities. Arguably, this is the most obvious and focal
agreement. We will refer to it as the perfect symmetric collusive agreement. Of course, if
this would not yield a stable cartel, managers could still try to coordinate on a different
agreement, either symmetric or asymmetric. In our theoretical analysis, however, we
3This follows from comparing (8), (11), (14) and (19). It is immediately clear that pD∗ is the




























= 1 − 1 = 0. Hence pU∗ = pE∗ if all ∆i = 0,




, it is immediate
that pB∗ > pU∗, as
∑
α2i < 1 for n > 1.
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rule out this option as we feel that it would be much harder to coordinate on such an
alternative.4 Of course, in the experimental implementation of our model, firms are free
to try to coordinate on whatever they can agree upon.
If firms collude on a common cost level ck, the regulated price simply equals p
y = ck
for all yardsticks, so they maximize joint utility
U = (py(ck, . . . , ck)− ck) +
(−ac2k + bck) = (−ac2k + bck) , (23)
which is maximized by setting
c∗k = c
m∗ = b/2a. (24)
As a joint cost level does not affect the price-cost margin, the cartel simply chooses to
maximize its managerial benefit. This implies for all yardsticks
uyiK =
(













−a (cy∗i )2 + bcy∗i )αi, (26)








−a (cy∗1 )2 + bcy∗1 )α1, (27)
as we already showed that the one-shot optimal cost level for a firm is independent of
the cost levels of the other firms. Therefore, the optimal deviation cost level is equal to
the non-cooperative cost level. Defining Ai ≡ αi/4a, we then find the values of uyiN , uyiD
and δˆy(αi) for the different yardsticks that are given in Table 1.
5
4Indeed, in our experiment we also observe that groups, if anything, coordinate on the perfect sym-
metric collusive agreement, irrespective of the distribution of market shares.
5For Uniform, uUiN is found by plugging (7) into (26), and u
U
iD by plugging (7) and (24) into (27).
From (21), we then have δˆU (αi). For EqualW, plugging (10) into (26) yields u
E
iN . Plugging (10) and
(24) into (27) then yields uEiD. For Discrim, plugging (13) into (26) yields u
D
iN . Plugging (13) and (24)
into (27) then yields uDiD. For BestPr, plugging (18) into (26) yields u
B
iN . Plugging (18) and (24) into
(27) then yields uBiD.
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Table 1: Non-cooperative utility (uyiN ), defection utility (u
y








b2 − 1 + 2∑nj=1 α2j − α2i) Ai (b2 + 1 + α2i − 2αi) 12 (1−αi)21−αi−∑nj 6=i α2j
EqualW Ai
(
b2 − (n−1n )2) Ai (b2 + (n−1n )2) 12
Discrim Ai
(
b2 − 1) Ai (b2 + 1) 12
BestPr Ai
(
b2 − 1) Ai (b2 − 1) 0
Hence industry structure only influences the critical discount factor in Uniform.
Under BestPr collusion is always sustainable. This is because deviation profits equal
non-cooperative profits. We thus have:6
Theorem 2. The critical discount factors are ranked
BestPr < EqualW = Discrim ≤ Uniform.
Only with symmetric market shares, Discrim = Uniform.
2.4 Summing up
From the analysis above, we thus have the following. If managers indeed set their cost
levels non-cooperatively, we expect to see the highest prices in BestPr, followed by
Uniform; EqualW; and Discrim, respectively. Yet, collusion is easiest to sustain in
BestPr, followed by EqualW and Discrim; and Uniform, respectively.
From a theoretical perspective, we thus expect to see the highest prices in BestPr:
noncooperative cost levels are then the highest, and collusion is easiest to sustain. We
also expect prices to be higher in EqualW than in Discrim, as noncooperative cost
6First note that the critical discount factor in a treatment is the highest critical discount factor of all
individual firms. Most of the results follow directly from Table 1. Note that δˆU (αi) ≤ 1/2 if and only
if (1− αi)2 ≤ 1− αi −∑j 6=i α2j , hence if and only if αi ≥∑j α2j . From footnote 3, ∑j α2j ≥ 1/n, with
equality if all firms are equally sized. As αi ≥∑j α2j has to be satisfied for all firms, this implies that it
cannot be satified if αi < 1/n, and is satisfied with equality if all firm are of size 1/n.
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levels are higher, and collusion is equally hard to sustain. But it is ambiguous how
prices in Uniform compare to those in either EqualW or Discrim. On the one hand,
noncooperative cost levels are higher in Uniform, but on the other hand, collusion is
harder to sustain, rendering the net effect ambiguous. Therefore, we use an experiment
to compare the price effects of these treatments.
We thus have
Corollary 1. Prices in BestPr are higher than prices in any other treatment. Prices
in EqualW are higher than those in Uniform. All other pairwise comparisons are
ambiguous from a theoretical perspective.
3 Experimental Design
In our experiment subjects play the game described above for at least 20 rounds. We
set a = 1/24 and b = 1 which ensures that the non-cooperative and collusive cost levels
in all our treatments are integers. To avoid possible end-game effects, the experiment
ends with a probability of 20% in each round from round 20 onwards (see also Normann
and Wallace, 2012). Subjects are randomly matched into groups at the beginning of the
experiment and play all rounds within the same group.
Every round consists of three steps. First, subjects can communicate using a chat
screen. This chat is completely anonymous. Second, subjects unilaterally choose cost
levels ci from the set {1, 2, . . . , 20}.7 Third, prices are determined using the relevant
yardstick. After each round, subjects learn the profits and managerial benefits they have
realized, and the cost levels that each subject has set.8 The unrestricted communication
we allow for creates circumstances that are closest to the real world. Also, without
communication, it is hard to sustain collusion in a cartel experiment with more than
7As we saw in the theory section, both the non-cooperative and the collusive strategy are independent
of the competitors’ actions. In that sense, our game boils down to a relatively straightforward prisoners’
dilemma game with two strategies. Still, we choose not to represent it as such in our experiment, as that
would get rid of much of the regulatory context that we feel is crucial for our purpose.
8Of course, in our set-up profit and managerial benefit are equally important in determining payoffs.
This was also outlined in the experimental instructions. Subjects indeed seemed to understand this as
they correctly answered control questions on this topic.
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two players, see e.g. Haan et al. (2009).9
Our experiment consists of two parts. Part A serves to compare the four different
yardsticks, and does so in an industry structure with two firms, where one firm is twice
as big as the other: with equally sized firms, there would be no difference between the
Uniform and EqualW treatments. Part B zooms in on the difference between the
Discrim and Uniform. These two yardsticks are most often used in the real world,
whereas we do not have a clear theoretical prediction concerning the relative performance
of the two, making a closer look all the more relevant. We do so by considering a number
of industry structures that differ with respect to the number of firms as well as their
relative size.
Table 2: Treatments part A.
Competitive Cost Level Collusive
Treatment c∗1 c∗2 price Cost Level δˆ
Uniform 8 4 6.67 12 1.00
EqualW 6 6 6.00 12 0.50
Discrim 1 1 1.00 12 0.50
BestPr 12 12 12.00 12 0.00
All treatments: α1 = 2/3, α2 = 1/3.
The treatments in part A are given in Table 2. For each treatment, the Table also
shows the non-cooperative cost level of each firm, the regulated price that results, the
symmetric cost level that maximizes joint profits, and the critical discount factor. All
these results follow from our discussion in section 2.10
9Although illegal in practice, note that cartels cannot be prosecuted or fined in this experiment.
10In fact, strictly speaking, in Discrim, the theoretical prediction would be for all firms to set a cost
level equal to 0. However, we do not allow our experimental subjects to choose cost levels lower than 1;
doing so would not only yield zero profits but also zero managerial benefits, which is likely to affect their
behavior in ways that interfere with the purpose of our experiment. However, that also has an effect on
the incentives to collude; taking into account that costs can not be lower than 1 imply a critical discount
factor of δˆD = 0.54. After careful deliberation, we have decided to work with our original theoretical
predictions – effectively assuming that for the subjects, the difference between δˆ = 0.50 and δˆ = 0.54
is negligible. Using δˆD = 0.54 rather than δˆD = 0.50 would hardly affect our results. If we would use
δˆD = 0.54, our statistical test when comparing the incidence of collusion should be one-sided rather
than two-sided when comparing Uniform and Discrim, or when comparing EqualW and Discrim.
In that case, the comparison in Duo66 in Table 9 would become significant at 10% (contradicting our
13
Throughout the experiment, we will use a loose interpretation of the critical discount
factor: rather than the strict theoretical interpretation that there will always be collusion
if the discount factor is bigger than δˆ, and there will never be collusion if it is smaller
than δˆ, we will interpret a higher δˆ as it being less likely that there will be collusion.
Note that for our specific parametrization the critical discount factor in Uniform is
equal to 1, which implies that the theoretical prediction is that a cartel will never be
stable under that yardstick.
Table 3: Treatments part B.
Industry Market Competitive Cost Level Collusive
Structure Share Uniform Discrim Cost
1 2 3 c∗1 c∗2 c∗3 p∗ c∗i , p
∗ Level δˆU δˆD
Trio444 1/3 1/3 1/3 4 4 4 4.00 1.00 12 0.50 0.50
Trio633 1/2 1/4 1/4 6 3 3 4.50 1.00 12 0.64 0.50
Trio642 1/2 1/3 1/6 6 4 2 4.67 1.00 12 0.74 0.50
Duo66 1/2 1/2 6 6 6.00 1.00 12 0.50 0.50
Duo84 2/3 1/3 8 4 6.67 1.00 12 1.00 0.50
Part B consists of 10 treatments: we study 5 different industry structures and con-
sider Discrim and Uniform in each. We now look at treatments with 2 and with
3 firms, that range from equally-sized to highly asymmetric firms. Table 3 gives an
overview of the treatments. Treatments with 3 firms are denoted TrioXYZ, with X, Y
and Z the relative sizes of firms 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Treatments with 2 firms are
denoted DuoXY, with X and Y the relative sizes of firms 1 and 2. Treatments Duo84 are
identical to those in part A; we include them here as well for ease of comparison. The
five treatments with a uniform yardstick are also studied in a companion paper (Dijkstra
et al., 2014), where we study the effect of industry structure on the performance of the
(weighted) uniform yardstick. Again, the table shows the non-cooperative cost level of
each firm in each treatment, the regulatory price that results, the symmetric collusive
cost level, and the critical discount factor that all follow directly from the analysis in
hypothesis), as would that in Trio444 (confirming our hypothesis). In Table 5 the comparison between
EqualW and Discrim would become significant at 5% rather than 10%.
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Section 2.
The experiment was conducted at the Groningen Experimental Economics Labo-
ratory (GrEELab) at the University of Groningen in 2013. A total of 132 subjects
participated in Part A, and 423 in part B, all students from the University of Groningen
(86%) or the Hanze University of Applied Sciences (14%), most of them in the fields
of economics and business (62%). Every session consisted of one treatment and lasted
between 80 and 130 minutes. Subjects signed in for sessions, while treatments were
randomly assigned to sessions.
Every treatment with two players was played in two sessions, every treatment with
three players in three. Between 14 and 18 subjects participated in a session, resulting in
15 to 18 groups per treatment. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Printed instructions were provided and read aloud. On their computer, subjects
first had to answer a number of questions correctly to ensure understanding of the
experiment. Participants were paid their cumulative earnings in euros. Since firm size
differed between participants, exchange rates were varied such that they would receive
identical amounts if they collude on cost level 12.11 Also, participants received an initial
endowment of e4. Average earnings were e16.22, ranging from e4.70 to e24.00.
4 Comparing the four yardsticks
In this section, we discuss the results of part A, where we compare 4 yardsticks in a
given industry structure. Figure 1 shows average prices over time.12 The figure suggests
that BestPr indeed yields the highest prices, while Discrim yields the lowest.
A Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the hypothesis that all four yardsticks lead to the same
price (p < 1%). For pairwise comparisons between any two treatments, we use the
Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test. Results are given in Table 4. The entries in the right-
hand panels indicate whether the row treatment yields prices that are significantly lower
(<) or higher (>) than the column treatment, or whether the difference is not significant
11This allows us to focus on the effect of asymmetries in industry structure without the possible
interference of fairness issues.
12Note that in Discrim, we take the weighted average price as defined in (14).
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Figure 1: Average price per round (across all groups).
Table 4: Price per treatment (across all rounds and groups).
Treatment Average EqualW Discrim BestPr
Uniform 10.76 ≈ ≈ <∗∗
EqualW 10.99 >∗ <+
Discrim 9.80 <∗∗∗
BestPr 11.65
Entries in the right-hand panel indicate whether the row treatment yields prices that are significantly
lower (<), significantly higher (>) or that do not differ significantly (≈) from the prices in the column
treatment. Differences between two treatments are tested using the MWU test for equality (two-sided
for Uniform–EqualW and Uniform–Discrim, one-sided for the other comparisons). + significantly
different at 10%; ∗ at 5%; ∗∗ at 1%; ∗∗∗ at 0.1%.
(≈). We use this convention throughout this paper.
We thus have the following:
Result 1. Prices with a best-practice yardstick are higher than prices with any other
yardstick. Prices with a uniform yardstick with an unweighted price are higher than
16
those with a discriminatory yardstick.
Note that the first part of the Result is in line with Corollary 1. We also find that
prices in EqualW are significantly higher than those in Uniform. Apparently, in this
case, the collusion effect (collusion is easier to sustain in EqualW) dominates the non-
cooperative effect (non-cooperative cost levels are lower in EqualW). Corollary 1 also
predicts that prices in EqualW are higher than those in Uniform, but our experimental
results do not bear that out.
In the above, we only tested Corollary 1, which considers the net effect on regulated
prices of non-cooperative cost levels on the one hand, and the extent of collusion on the
other. Yet, our experimental results also allows us to disentangle these two effects.
Table 5: Incidence of full collusion per treatment (across all rounds and groups).
Treatment Average EqualW Discrim BestPr
Uniform 43.4% <∗ ≈ <∗∗∗
EqualW 71.2% >+ <+
Discrim 56.1% <∗∗∗
BestPr 92.0%
Entries in the right-hand panel indicate whether the row treatment yields collusion rates that are sig-
nificantly lower (<), significantly higher (>) or that do not differ significantly (≈) from the rates in
the column treatment. Differences between two treatments are tested using the MWU test for equality
(two-sided for EqualW–Discrim, one-sided for the other comparisons). + significantly different at 10%;
∗ at 5%; ∗∗∗ at 0.1%.
First consider the extent of collusion. Table 5 considers the incidence of full collusion
(i.e. the percentage of cases where all firms set the collusive cost level of 12). A Kruskal-
Wallis test indicates differences between all yardsticks (p < 0.1%). Pairwise comparisons
are given in Table 5. Theorem 2 predicts the highest incidence of collusion in BestPr,
followed by EqualW and Discrim, whereas Uniform has the lowest incidence. This is
largely what we find in Table 5: the incidence of full collusion in BestPr is significantly
higher than in any other treatment, whereas the incidence in Uniform is significantly
lower than that in EqualW and BestPr. We do however find a difference between
Discrim and EqualW (albeit only significant at 10%), whereas we do not find a dif-
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ference between Discrim and Uniform. A Jonckheere-Terpstra test13 with the ordered
alternative hypothesis that the incidence of full collusion is highest in BestPr, followed
by EqualW, Discrim, and Uniform, respectively, is highly significant (p < 0.1%).
Table 6: Price if no collusion, per treatment
Treatment Average EqualW Discrim BestPr
Uniform 9.76 >+ >∗∗ >∗
EqualW 8.59 >+ ≈
Discrim 7.12 ≈
BestPr 7.11
Only rounds are included in which not all firms in a group set the fully collusive cost level of 12. Entries
in the right-hand panel indicate whether the row treatment yields prices that are significantly lower (<),
significantly higher (>) or that do not differ significantly (≈) from the average prices in the column
treatment. Differences between two treatments are tested using the MWU test for equality (one-sided).
+ significantly different at 10%; ∗ at 5%; ∗∗ at 1%.
Second, consider the effect on the non-cooperative cost level. Table 6 looks at the
average price in rounds where there is no collusion in the sense defined above (i.e. it is
not the case that all firms set a cost level of 12). Arguably, these are the cases in which
firms behave non-cooperatively. Note that for BestPr the results are hard to interpret,
as there both the collusive and the non-ccoperative cost level equals 12. The results
for the other treatments are perfectly in line with Theorem 1: prices in Discrim are
lower than those in either Uniform or EqualW, whereas prices in Uniform are also
higher than those in EqualW. A Jonckheere-Terpstra test with the ordered alternative
hypothesis that prices in Uniform are higher than those in EqualW which in turn are
higher than those in Discrim, is highly significant (p < 0.1%).
5 Comparing the uniform and discriminatory benchmarks
Figure 2 gives the average price in each period in Uniform and Discrim, for each of the
5 industry structures we consider in part B of our experiment. In Table 7 we compare
prices for each industry structure.
13This test is equivalent to the Kruskal-Wallis test but has an unordered alternative hypothesis. See
Jonckheere (1954) or Terpstra (1952).
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Figure 2: Average price per round for each industry structure (across all groups).
Table 7: Comparison of Price for Uniform and Discrim for each industry structure
(averages across all rounds and groups).
Structure Uniform Discrim
Trio444 11.00 >+ 10.48
Trio633 10.04 >∗ 8.45
Trio642 9.48 ≈ 9.06
Triopolies 10.18 >∗ 9.34
Duo66 10.32 ≈ 10.73
Duo84 10.76 ≈ 9.80
Duopolies 10.54 ≈ 10.24
Homogeneous 10.67 ≈ 10.61
Heterogeneous 10.08 >∗ 9.13
All 10.32 >+ 9.71
Entries between values indicate whether prices in Uniform are significantly lower (<), significantly
higher (>), or do not differ significantly (≈) from those in Discrim. Differences are tested using
the MWU test for equality (one-sided for Trio444, Duo66 and Homogeneous; two-sided for other
comparisons). +: significant at 10%; ∗ at 5%.
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For most industry structures we find higher prices with Uniform. This difference
is significant for Trio444 and Trio633. The only exception is Duo66, where Discrim
yields higher prices – but not significantly so. Interestingly, Potters et al. (2004) also
found higher prices with a discriminatory rather than a uniform yardstick, in an industry
structure that is equivalent to our Duo66.
Tests for multiple industry structures indicate that Discrim yields significantly lower
prices in triopolies and heterogeneous industries. Most importantly, taking all industry
structures together, Discrim yields significantly lower prices at the 10%-level.14















Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
14 In this case, we have done the tests for multiple industries by simply interpreting all data generated
by the Uniform treatments as coming from a single population, and treating all data generated by
the Discrim treatments likewise. One alternative to make the data generated by different industry
structures more comparable, is to do the following. First subtract the average price in Discrim/Trio444
from all observations in Trio444. Then, do the same for all other industry structures (thus, subtract
the average price in Discrim/Trio633 from all observations in Trio633, etc.). Treating the resulting
cleaned data generated by the Uniform treatments as coming from a single population, and treating all
resulting cleaned data generated by the Discrim treatments likewise, allows us to filter out the effect of
industry structure while still doing a non-parametric test on the difference between the two yardsticks.
Performing this analysis, however, yields the same qualitative results as those given in the Table.
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Table 9: Incidence of full collusion in Uniform and Discrim for each industry structure
(averages across all rounds and groups).
Structure Uniform Discrim
Trio444 71.7% ≈ 62.8%
Trio633 58.1% >∗ 26.3%
Trio642 34.4% ≈ 44.0%
Triopolies 54.7% ≈ 44.4%
Duo66 56.2% ≈ 73.8%
Duo84 43.4% ≈ 56.1%
Duopolies 49.8% ≈ 64.4%
Homogeneous 64.2% ≈ 68.3%
Heterogeneous 45.1% ≈ 42.7%
Overall 52.8% ≈ 52.8%
Entries between values indicate whether the incidence of full collusion under Uniform is significantly
lower (<), significantly higher (>), or does not differ significantly (≈) from the price under Discrim.
Differences between two treatments are tested using the MWU test for equality (two-sided for Trio444,
Duo66, Homogeneous, Triopolies, Duopolies and Overall; one-sided for other comparisons). ∗: significant
at 5%.
Table 8 takes a parametric approach, comparing both yardsticks by means of random-
effects OLS regressions. Column (1) explains price solely by a constant and a Discrim-
dummy. Column (2) adds dummies to correct for the effect of different industry struc-
tures.15 In both regressions, Discrim yardstick leads to significantly lower prices at the
10%-level. We thus have
Result 2. Prices are lower with a discriminatory yardstick than with a uniform yard-
stick. This effect is largely driven by industries with 3 firms, and industries where market
shares are heterogeneous.
Again, we can disentangle the effects of collusion and noncooperative cost levels.
Table 9 looks at the incidence of collusion. In this case, we see little difference between
the two yardsticks, even after aggregating them. The only significant difference is found
in Trio633, where Uniform leads to a higher incidence of collusion, an effect that runs
counter to our theoretical prediction. Average prices in non-collusive periods are given in
Table 10. Non-cooperative cost levels in Uniform are indeed clearly higher than those
15Note therefore that this is essentially the parametric version of then non-parametric test we propose
in fn. 14.
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in Discrim, at a significance level of 0.1%. Hence, lower non-cooperative cost levels are
the driving force behind the lower prices in Discrim.
Table 10: Prices if no full collusion in Uniform and Discrim for each industry structure
(averages across all rounds and groups).
Structure Uniform Discrim
Trio444 8.03 ≈ 8.09
Trio633 7.78 ≈ 7.27
Trio642 8.27 >∗ 6.91
Triopolies 8.07 >+ 7.43
Duo66 8.73 >+ 6.96
Duo84 9.76 >∗∗ 7.12
Duopolies 9.26 >∗∗∗ 7.06
Homogeneous 8.44 ≈ 7.62
Heterogeneous 8.70 >∗∗∗ 7.11
Overall 8.61 >∗∗∗ 7.29
Entries between values indicate whether prices under Uniform are significantly lower (<), signifi-
cantly higher (>), or do not differ significantly (≈) from the price under Discrim. Differences are
tested using the MWU test for equality (one-sided). +: significant at 10%; ∗ at 5%; ∗∗ at 1%; ∗∗∗ at 0.1%.
Whereas our theoretical framework predicts a tradeoff between a non-cooperative
and a collusive effect when comparing Discrim and Uniform, our experimental results
indicate that the collusive effect in fact is not really there. That is remarkable, as we
do find strong support for our theoretical predictions concerning the extent of collusion
when we compare four yardstick in part A of our experiment.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the effect of the design of yardstick competition on
the prices consumers have to pay. As alternative designs, we distinguish the uniform
yardstick, the unweighted uniform yardstick, the discriminatory yardstick, and the best-
practice yardstick. In all cases, the effect of a design on prices depends on two different
mechanisms: the incentives for firms to increase efficiency on the one hand and the
incentives for firms to collude on the other. The risk of collusion in case of yardstick
competition was already mentioned by Shleifer (1985), but to what extent that risk could
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mitigate the benefits of yardstick competition has hardly been analyzed up to now. In
an economic experiment, Potters et al. (2004) find that the benefits of a discriminatory
yardstick in terms of a higher productive efficiency are more than neutralized by the costs
in terms of higher prices resulting from an increased risk of collusion. This experiment is
conducted using two equally sized firms, triggering the question whether it also holds in
heterogeneous industries. In an earlier paper (Dijkstra et al., 2014), we found that the
degree of heterogeneity affects the probability of collusion. More specifically, we found
that the probability of collusion in case of a uniform yardstick is negatively related to the
level of heterogeneity of an industry. Using a similar experimental set up, we now have
analyzed the ultimate price effects of different yardstick designs against the background
of a heterogeneous industry.
On the basis of a theoretical analysis we find that the best-practice yardstick yields
the lowest power of incentive to improve efficiency as well as the highest probability of
collusion. Hence, this yardstick is expected to result in the highest prices, which was
confirmed by the experimental analysis. Despite its name, the best-practice yardstick has
the worst performance seen from the perspective of consumer prices. The theoretical
analysis also shows that the discriminatory yardstick results in lower prices than the
unweighted uniform yardstick, which was also confirmed by the economic experiment.
The theory, however, does not give a clear answer on the relative performance of the
discriminatory versus the uniform yardstick. The discriminatory yardstick gives the
highest power of incentive to reduce costs, but it also has a higher probability of collusion
than the uniform yardstick. In the experimental analysis, we find that the advantage of
the discriminatory yardstick in terms of giving incentives to improve productive efficiency
exceeds the disadvantage of a relatively higher risk of collusion. This conclusion appears
to be robust for different degrees of heterogeneity of the industry. So, we conclude that
the discriminatory yardstick yields the lowest prices for consumers.
From our analysis, we learn that yardstick competition may indeed result in collusion
between the regulated firms, but that this effect does generally not outweigh the benefits
of this type of competition for consumer prices. So, implementing yardstick competition
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in order to mimic competition in industries where otherwise no competition would exist,
can be beneficial for consumers. Having said this, it must be acknowledged that collusion
may occur and the risk of it depends on the degree of heterogeneity of the industry.
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Appendix
A Instructions Trio642 Discriminatory
Introduction
You are going to participate in an experiment in economics. We will first read the in-
structions aloud. Then you will have time to read them on your own. The instructions
are identical for all participants. After reading, there is the possibility to ask questions
individually. The experiment is expected to last for approximately 90 minutes. Please
refrain from talking during the entire experiment.
You will play with two other players, chosen at random. Together, you and those two other
players form a group. You will never learn who the other players are. The experiment
lasts for at least 20 rounds. In each round, you will play with the same two players. Before
the experiment starts, we randomly determine whether you are player 1, player 2 or player
3 in your group.
In this experiment you can earn points. The number of points you earn depends on
the decisions made by you and those made by the other players in your group.
Instructions
In the experiment, each player represents a company. Each player owns a number of
production units. In each round, each player has to choose one cost level for all production
units that he or she owns. Player 1 owns 1 production unit. Player 2 owns 2 production
units. Player 3 owns 3 production units. At the beginning of the experiment, each player
starts with 40 points for each production unit that he or she owns. Player 1 will thus
receive 40 points, player 2 receives 80 points and player 3 receives 120 points. In each
round, the number of points you earn consists of two components: profit and managerial
benefit. At the end of each round, the points that you earned in that round will be added
to your account.
After the experiment the number of points in your account will be converted to euros.
Player 1 will receive e1 for every 10 points that he or she has, player 2 will receive e1 for
every 20 points, and player 3 will receive e1 for every 30 points.
Each round consists of three steps. These steps are the same in every round.
Step 1: communication
A chat box will appear on your screen. You can discuss anything you want with the other
players in your group. However, you are not allowed to identify yourself by name, gender,
appearance, nationality, or in any other way. If you do, you will not receive any payment
after the experiment. You are only allowed to communicate in English.
You have a limited amount of time to chat. A timer in the top right corner of the
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screen will inform you of the amount of time you have left. If you prefer not to chat any
more, you can leave the chat by pressing the “Leave Chat” button. Once you have left
the chat, you cannot return in that round. Once two persons have left the chat, the chat
will end automatically.
Step 2: choice of cost level
Each player chooses one cost level for all the production units that he or she owns. You
can choose your cost level from the following possibilities:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
The cost level you choose will influence the profits in that round for you and the other
players. It will also influence your managerial benefit.
Each production unit produces one unit of output. The price you will receive per unit
of output equals the average cost level of all production units owned by the other players.
Example. Suppose that player 1 chooses a cost level of 8, player 2 chooses a cost level
of 5 and player 3 chooses a cost level of 10. Keeping in mind that player 2 owns 2
production units, and player 3 owns 3 production units, the price for each unit of output




5 = 8, which is the average cost level of the
production units owned by players 2 and 3. The price per unit for player 2 then equals
1×8+3×10
1+3 = 38/4 = 9.5, which is the average cost level of the production units owned by
players 1 and 3. The price per unit for player 3 then equals 1×8+2×51+2 = 18/3 = 6. 
The profit you earn on each unit of output equals your price minus your cost level:
your profit = your number of production units× (your price− your cost level) .
For each of your production units you also receive a managerial benefit. This graph shows
how your managerial benefit per production unit depends on your cost level:
The number of points you receive in a round is equal to your profit plus your managerial
benefit.
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If you prefer, you can also calculate your profit and managerial benefit using a profit
calculator that we will provide on screen during the experiment. Alternatively, you can
find your profit and your managerial benefit in a table that we provide. These tables are
added to these instructions. Please put these tables in front of you now.
Each table reads as follows. Rows represent the possible cost levels you can choose.
Columns represent the average cost level per production unit of the other two players.
Where a row and a column intersect, you can find your profit. Your managerial benefit is
indicated in the last column.
Example. We consider a case in which player 1 chooses a cost level of 8, player 2 chooses a
cost level of 5 and player 3 chooses a cost level of 10. Prices, profits, managerial benefits,
and number of points for all players can be found as follows.
• Consider player 1. Its cost level is 8. The average cost level of the production
units owned by players 2 and 3 is 2×5+3×102+3 =
10+30
5 = 8. Player 1’s profit can be
found in Table 1, in the row marked 8, and the column marked 8. You can see that
player 1 receives a profit of 0.00 points. Note that player 1 can also calculate this
directly. The price per unit of output for player 1 equals the average cost level of
all production units owned by the other players, which is 8. As player 1 owns one
production unit, profit is 8− 8 = 0.
At the end of the row marked 8, you can see that player 1 receives a managerial
benefit of 5.33 points. This can also roughly be seen from the graph.
In total, player 1 thus receives 0.00 + 5.33 = 5.33 points.
• Consider player 2. Its cost level is 5. The average cost level of the production units
owned by players 1 and 3 is 1×8+3×101+3 =
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4 = 9.5. If it were 9, player 2’s profit could
be found in Table 2 (the row marked 5, the column marked 9) to equal 8.00. If it
were 10, player 2’s profit could be found in Table 2 (the row marked 5, the column
marked 10) to equal 10.00. As the average cost level of the other production units
is 9.5, player 2’s profit is exactly halfway and thus equals 9.00 points. Alternatively,
note that price per unit for player 2 equals 9.5. As player 2 owns two production
units, profit is 2× (9.5− 5) = 9.
The managerial benefit of player 2 can be found at the end of the row marked 5
to equal 7.92 points. This can also roughly be seen from the graph. With cost
level 5, managerial benefit per production unit is roughly 3.95, which implies total
managerial benefit of 2× 3.95 ≈ 7.9.
In total, player 2 thus receives 9.00 + 7.92 = 16.92 points.
• Consider player 3. Its cost level is 10. The average cost level of the production
units owned by players 1 and 2 is 1×8+2×51+2 =
18
3 = 6. Player 3’s profit can be
found in Table 3 (the row marked 10, the column marked 6), to equal -12.00 points.
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Alternatively, price per unit for player 3 equals 6. As player 3 owns three production
units, profit is 3× (6− 10) = −12.
The managerial benefit of player 3 can be found at the end of the row marked 10
to equal 17.50 points. This can also roughly be seen from the graph. With cost
level 10, managerial benefit per production unit is roughly 5.8, which implies total
managerial benefit of 3× 5.8 ≈ 17.5.
In total, player 3 thus receives −12.00 + 17.50 = 5.50 points.
Step 3: summary
After all players have made their decision, you will receive the following information: the
cost levels chosen by the other players, your price for each unit of output, your profit, your
managerial benefit, and the current state of your account. Throughout the experiment,
there will also be a box on your screen where you can observe the decisions made by you
and the other players in each previous round.
End of experiment
You will at least play 20 rounds. From round 20 onwards, the experiment ends with a
20% probability at the end of each round. With a probability of 80%, a new round starts.
You receive a message on your screen if no further round will take place.
At the end of the experiment the number of points in your account will be converted to
euros. Before you can collect your payment in private, you have to hand in the instructions.
After the experiment, please do not discuss the content of the experiment with
anyone, including people who did not participate.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B Cost levels and Prices in all groups
B.1 Part A
Figure B.1: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Uniform /
Duo84 with a Uniform yardstick.
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Figure B.2: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in EqualW /
Duo84 with a uniform unweighted yardstick.
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Figure B.3: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Discrim /
Duo84 with a Discriminatory yardstick.
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Figure B.4: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in BestPr /
Duo84 with a Best-Practice yardstick.
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B.2 Part B
Figure B.5: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Trio444 with a
Uniform yardstick.
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Figure B.6: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Trio633 with a
Uniform yardstick.
37
Figure B.7: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Trio642 with a
Uniform yardstick.
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Figure B.8: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Duo66 with a
Uniform yardstick.
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Figure B.9: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Trio444 with a
Discriminatory yardstick.
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Figure B.10: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Trio633 with
a Discriminatory yardstick.
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Figure B.11: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Trio642 with
a Discriminatory yardstick.
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